The why good incentives are no substitute for good citizens Bowles, Samuel creator author. text bibliography ctu 2016 monographic eng

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xvi, 272 pages : illustrations ; 22 cm. Should the idea of economic man-the amoral and self-interested Homo economicus-determine how we expect people to respond to monetary rewards, punishments, and other incentives? Samuel Bowles answers with a resounding "no." Policies that follow from this paradigm, he shows, may "crowd out" ethical and generous motives and thus backfire. But incentives per se are not really the culprit. Bowles shows that crowding out occurs when the message conveyed by fines and rewards is that self-interest is expected, that the employer thinks the workforce is lazy, or that the citizen cannot otherwise be trusted to contribute to the public good. Using historical and recent case studies as well as behavioral experiments, Bowles shows how well-designed incentives can crowd in the civic motives on which good governance depends. The problem with homo economicus -- A constitution for knaves -- Moral sentiments and material interests -- Incentives as information -- A liberal civic culture -- The legislator's dilemma -- A mandate for Aristotle's legislator. Samuel Bowles. Parts of this book were given as the Castle Lectures in Yale's Program in Ethics, Politics, and Economics, delivered by Samuel Bowles at Yale University in 2010. Includes bibliographical references (pages 245-266) and index. Economics Moral and ethical aspects Law and economics Law and economics Economics Moral and ethical aspects Anreiz Homo oeconomicus Wirtschaftliches Verhalten Gemeinwohl Arbeitsmotivation 08.38 ethics 330 B.S.M 9780300163803 0300163800 2015956890 ERASA 151127 20260825113055.0 a19173484 eng