03371cam a2200505Ii 4500001001000000003000600010005001700016008004100033010001700074020001800091020001500109040013700124082001900261100008200280245009900362246006000461264005800521264001100579300004600590336002600636337002800662338002700690490005900717500016600776504006700942505024001009520082501249650004802074650008002122650005502202650007402257650002302331650003302354650004302387650002702430650003402457650002902491830011002520942001502630945002902645949007202674949007002746980003602816999001302852a19173484SIRSI20260825113055.0151127s2016    ctua     b    001 0 eng d  a  2015956890  a9780300163803  a0300163800  aERASAbengerdacERASAdYDXCPdBDXdBTCTAdOCLCQdOCLCOdRCJdOCLCFdCDXdVP@dOCLdCHVBKdNGUdMOFdIDUdL2UdOCLCOdOCLCAdUtOrBLW04a330223bB.S.M1 aBowles, Samuel,eauthor.0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n791115169105714aThe moral economy :bwhy good incentives are no substitute for good citizens /cSamuel Bowles.30aWhy good incentives are no substitute for good citizens 1aNew Haven ;aLondon :bYale University Press,c[2016] 4c©2016  axvi, 272 pages :billustrations ;c22 cm.  atextbtxt2rdacontent  aunmediatedbn2rdamedia  avolumebnc2rdacarrier1 aThe castle lectures in ethics, politics, and economics  aParts of this book were given as the Castle Lectures in Yale's Program in Ethics, Politics, and Economics, delivered by Samuel Bowles at Yale University in 2010.  aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 245-266) and index.00tThe problem with homo economicus --tA constitution for knaves --tMoral sentiments and material interests --tIncentives as information --tA liberal civic culture --tThe legislator's dilemma --tA mandate for Aristotle's legislator.  aShould the idea of economic man-the amoral and self-interested Homo economicus-determine how we expect people to respond to monetary rewards, punishments, and other incentives? Samuel Bowles answers with a resounding "no." Policies that follow from this paradigm, he shows, may "crowd out" ethical and generous motives and thus backfire. But incentives per se are not really the culprit. Bowles shows that crowding out occurs when the message conveyed by fines and rewards is that self-interest is expected, that the employer thinks the workforce is lazy, or that the citizen cannot otherwise be trusted to contribute to the public good. Using historical and recent case studies as well as behavioral experiments, Bowles shows how well-designed incentives can crowd in the civic motives on which good governance depends. 0aEconomicsxMoral and ethical aspects.91058 0aLaw and economics.0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh9500937691059 7aLaw and economics.2fast0(OCoLC)fst0099390091059 7aEconomicsxMoral and ethical aspects.2fast0(OCoLC)fst0090216291058 7aAnreiz.2gnd91060 7aHomo oeconomicus.2gnd91061 7aWirtschaftliches Verhalten.2gnd91062 7aGemeinwohl.2gnd91063 7aArbeitsmotivation.2gnd91064 7a08.38 ethics.2nbc91065 0aCastle lectures in ethics, politics, and economics.0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no9601030591066  2ddccBKn0  aGIFTbOthersc2026-08-25  aHB72 .B69 2016hUPJOE3BKi000078998469lPATERNO-3mUP-PATtBOOKwLC  aAQ12648080wLCmACQUISTNSkON-ORDERlON-ORDERoGOBIrYsYestBOOK  a20170105e$22.55f927171nYBP21  c244d244