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010 _a 2015956890
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020 _a0300163800
040 _aERASA
_beng
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082 0 4 _a330
_223
_bB.S.M
100 1 _aBowles, Samuel,
_eauthor.
_0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n79111516
_91057
245 1 4 _aThe moral economy :
_bwhy good incentives are no substitute for good citizens /
_cSamuel Bowles.
246 3 0 _aWhy good incentives are no substitute for good citizens
264 1 _aNew Haven ;
_aLondon :
_bYale University Press,
_c[2016]
264 4 _c©2016
300 _axvi, 272 pages :
_billustrations ;
_c22 cm.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _aunmediated
_bn
_2rdamedia
338 _avolume
_bnc
_2rdacarrier
490 1 _aThe castle lectures in ethics, politics, and economics
500 _aParts of this book were given as the Castle Lectures in Yale's Program in Ethics, Politics, and Economics, delivered by Samuel Bowles at Yale University in 2010.
504 _aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 245-266) and index.
505 0 0 _tThe problem with homo economicus --
_tA constitution for knaves --
_tMoral sentiments and material interests --
_tIncentives as information --
_tA liberal civic culture --
_tThe legislator's dilemma --
_tA mandate for Aristotle's legislator.
520 _aShould the idea of economic man-the amoral and self-interested Homo economicus-determine how we expect people to respond to monetary rewards, punishments, and other incentives? Samuel Bowles answers with a resounding "no." Policies that follow from this paradigm, he shows, may "crowd out" ethical and generous motives and thus backfire. But incentives per se are not really the culprit. Bowles shows that crowding out occurs when the message conveyed by fines and rewards is that self-interest is expected, that the employer thinks the workforce is lazy, or that the citizen cannot otherwise be trusted to contribute to the public good. Using historical and recent case studies as well as behavioral experiments, Bowles shows how well-designed incentives can crowd in the civic motives on which good governance depends.
650 0 _aEconomics
_xMoral and ethical aspects.
_91058
650 0 _aLaw and economics.
_0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh95009376
_91059
650 7 _aLaw and economics.
_2fast
_0(OCoLC)fst00993900
_91059
650 7 _aEconomics
_xMoral and ethical aspects.
_2fast
_0(OCoLC)fst00902162
_91058
650 7 _aAnreiz.
_2gnd
_91060
650 7 _aHomo oeconomicus.
_2gnd
_91061
650 7 _aWirtschaftliches Verhalten.
_2gnd
_91062
650 7 _aGemeinwohl.
_2gnd
_91063
650 7 _aArbeitsmotivation.
_2gnd
_91064
650 7 _a08.38 ethics.
_2nbc
_91065
830 0 _aCastle lectures in ethics, politics, and economics.
_0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no96010305
_91066
942 _2ddc
_cBK
_n0
945 _aGIFT
_bOthers
_c2026-08-25
949 _aHB72 .B69 2016
_hUPJOE3BK
_i000078998469
_lPATERNO-3
_mUP-PAT
_tBOOK
_wLC
949 _aAQ12648080
_wLC
_mACQUISTNS
_kON-ORDER
_lON-ORDER
_oGOBI
_rY
_sYes
_tBOOK
980 _a20170105
_e$22.55
_f927171
_nYBP21
999 _c244
_d244